What Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing? by Grenig, Jay E.
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2000
What Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
at Sentencing?
Jay E. Grenig
Marquette University Law School, jay.grenig@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Jay E. Grenig, What Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing?, 2000-01 Term
Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 141 (2000). © 2000 American Bar Association. This information or any
portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the
American Bar Association.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Grenig, Jay E., "What Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing?" (2000). Faculty Publications. Paper 407.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/407
CRIMINAL P R O C E D U R E
What Constitutes Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
at Sentencing?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 141-144. © 2000 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Was Paul Glover denied effective
assistance of counsel when his
lawyers failed to argue that Glover's
money-laundering offenses should
be grouped with his labor racketeer-
ing offenses in calculating his sen-
tence under the federal sentencing
guidelines?
FACTS
In June 1995, Paul Glover, the vice-
president and general counsel of the
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and
Warehouse Workers Union, was con-
victed in federal court of conspiracy,
soliciting and receiving kickbacks,
money laundering, and tax evasion.
His conviction arose out of his con-
duct in connection with a series of
investments made with money
belonging to the pension and health
and welfare funds of a Chicago
union.
In the Preliminary Presentence
Investigation Report ("PPSI"), the
United States Probation Office rec-
ommended grouping the money-
laundering and kickback counts
pursuant to the Federal Uniform
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Sentencing Guidelines. The United
States objected to the PPSI, arguing
that the money-laundering and
kickback offenses should not be
grouped together and that Glover
should receive a two-level multiple
count adjustment under the guide-
lines. Glover's counsel did not file a
written response. At the sentencing
hearing, the court asked Glover's
counsel to address the government's
objections to the grouping of offens-
es. He responded that he thought
grouping was "appropriate" but did
not cite any authority.
The district court ruled for the gov-
ernment and ordered that the
money-laundering and kickback
offenses be treated separately. The
district court determined that
Glover's adjusted offense level under
the sentencing guidelines was 28
and that his criminal history catego-
ry was I, resulting in a sentencing
range of 78 to 97 months in prison.
The court selected a midpoint in the
(Continued on Page 142)
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range, sentencing Glover to 84
months in prison.
Glover then appealed his convic-
tion. Counsel again did not chal-
lenge the district court's refusal to
group together the money-launder-
ing and kickback offenses. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion and sentence in December
1996.
In November 1997, Glover filed a
motion to vacate, set aside, or cor-
rect his sentence on the ground that
his lawyer was ineffective in failing
to argue that the sentencing court
should have grouped his money-
laundering offenses with his con-
spiracy and kickback offenses under
the Federal Uniform Sentencing
Guidelines. Glover argued that, but
for the errors of his counsel, his
adjusted offense level would have
been 26, resulting in a range of
63-78 months' imprisonment. The
district court denied the motion,
and Glover appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
Glover claimed that his attorney's
failure to argue the correct interpre-
tation of the sentencing guidelines
led to an adjusted offense level two
levels higher than it should have
been. He argued that the Seventh
Circuit's decision in United States v.
Wilson, 98 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 1996),
had held that money-laundering
offenses and mail-fraud offenses
should be grouped together under
the Federal Uniform Sentencing
Guidelines.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court in an unpublished opin-
ion. It explained that in order to
successfully claim ineffective assis-
tance, Glover would need to show
both that his counsel performed
below a constitutional threshold and
that the deficient performance prej-
udiced him. The Seventh Circuit
noted that if Glover was correct
about the errors of his counsel, his
sentence should have been six to 21
months lower than the 84-month
sentence he received. The court
concluded, however, that this poten-
tial decrease is not sufficiently sig-
nificant to be cognizable on collater-
al attack.
The Supreme Court granted
Glover's petition for a writ of certio-
rari and is now reviewing the
Seventh Circuit's decision. 120 S.Ct.
2716 (1999).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel accords a
criminal defendant the right "to
have the assistance of counsel for
his defense." The Supreme Court
has recognized that the right to
counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel. McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Counsel can deprive a defendant of
the right to effective assistance
merely by failing to render "ade-
quate legal assistance." Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 427 U.S. 97, 344 (1976).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court
ruled that the proper standard for
attorney performance is that of rea-
sonably effective assistance. It stat-
ed that the benchmark for judging a
claim of ineffectiveness is whether
the counsel's conduct so under-
mined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having pro-
duced a just result.
According to the Supreme Court,
there are two components in deter-
mining whether counsel's assistance
was so defective as to require rever-
sal of conviction: (1) the defendant
must show that counsel's perfor-
mance was deficient, in that the
attorney made errors so serious that
he or she was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment; and (2)
the defendant must show that the
deficient performance "prejudiced"
his defense by showing that coun-
sel's errors were so serious as to
deprive him of a fair trial-a trial
whose result is reliable. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The Seventh Circuit has taken the
position that only a significant
increase in the sentence rises to the
level of the type of prejudice that
will support an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim on collateral
attack. See Martin v. United States,
109 F.3d 1177 (7th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 931 (1997);
Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548
(7th Cir. 1993).
Durrive involved a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel relating to
the federal sentencing guidelines.
Interpreting the Supreme Court's
decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U.S. 364 (1993), the Seventh
Circuit ruled that in the absence of
"[g]rave errors by judge and coun-
sel," misapplication of the federal
sentencing guidelines does not make
the sentence "unreliable or ... fun-
damentally unfair."
Glover argues that Strickland does
not provide any support for the
Seventh Circuit's requirement of
"significant" prejudice. He argues
that Strickland established the
clear rule that the prejudice prong
is satisfied where there is a "reason-
able probability that, but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have
been different."
According to Glover, in adopting its
"significant prejudice" requirement,
the Seventh Circuit was plainly
motivated in part by concerns about
the burden that habeas corpus chal-
lenges place on the federal judiciary.
However, he argues that vindication
Issue No. 3
of basic constitutional rights should
not be denied on the basis that the
judicial procedures to enforce them
are time-consuming or expensive.
Glover suggests that the Seventh
Circuit's fears are overblown and
that only a limited number of peti-
tioners will be able to identify with
specificity a particular sentencing
guideline provision that was incor-
rectly calculated and then make the
required showing of a different out-
come by a "reasonable probability."
It is Glover's position that the
Seventh Circuit's refusal to correct
erroneous sentences unless the peri-
od of undeserved imprisonment is
"sufficiently significant" is bad poli-
cy and an anathema to the law. He
says that upholding incorrect sen-
tences thwarts the purposes of
Congress in enacting the sentencing
guidelines by allowing disparities in
sentences to flourish and calls into
question the judiciary's commit-
ment to fairness.
Glover claims that the six to 21
additional months of imprisonment
caused by his counsel's ineffective
assistance plainly constitutes the
"difference in outcome" required to
satisfy the Strickland prejudice test.
He also argues that the Seventh
Circuit's requirement for "signifi-
cant prejudice" is incompatible with
the Supreme Court's most funda-
mental teachings regarding the pro-
tections of the Sixth Amendment.
Glover notes that the constitutional
right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment is implicated by any
term of imprisonment, no matter
how short. See Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
The government responds that the
failure of Glover's counsel to argue
that his money-laundering and rack-
eteering offenses should be grouped
under the sentencing guidelines did
not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. The government agrees
that Strickland should apply to
issues concerning the alleged inef-
fectiveness of counsel in sentencing
proceedings that involve the guide-
lines. Nonetheless, the government
contends that the application of the
Strickland test to sentencing pro-
ceedings under the guidelines
should take into account the
particular characteristics of those
proceedings.
The government notes that the
judge retains significant discretion
in applying the guidelines to the
particular facts before him. The
judge must select a sentence from
within the applicable guidelines
range and must decide whether to
depart from the guidelines.
Additionally, not every claim rele-
vant to the guidelines criteria will
change the applicable guidelines
range, and because there is substan-
tial overlap among guidelines
ranges, not every change in the
guidelines range will have an impact
on the defendant's sentence.
Therefore, the government argues, it
will usually be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a reviewing court to assess
the reasonableness of counsel's deci-
sion to focus on one claim rather
than another. Moreover, the govern-
ment says that it will frequently be
difficult or impossible for the
reviewing court to determine
whether the failure to raise a partic-
ular claim resulted in a reasonable
probability of a different sentencing
outcome.
The government also asserts that
collateral relief is rarely available for
claims that do not assert constitu-
tional or jurisdictional errors. It
stresses that errors in the applica-
tion of the guidelines do not impli-
cate the determination of guilt or
innocence. The government
observes that the vast majority of
the federal courts of appeals have
held that, barring extraordinary cir-
cumstances, an error in the applica-
tion of the sentencing guidelines
cannot be raised in a collateral pro-
ceeding. See, e.g., United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.
1999); Jones v. United States, 178
F.3d 790 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
120 S.Ct. 335 (1999); United States
v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1164
(1999).
According to the government, the
Seventh Circuit correctly recog-
nized the need to customize the
Strickland analysis to the nature of
noncapital sentencing proceedings.
However, the government asserts
that, in its effort to tailor the analy-
sis to that context, the Seventh
Circuit modified the prejudice
inquiry in a manner that is both
inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's cases and unworkable.
Although it agrees with Glover that
the Seventh Circuit did not apply
the correct prejudice inquiry, the
government contends that the fail-
ure of Glover's counsel to argue that
his client's money-laundering and
racketeering offenses should be
grouped did not fall below an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness.
Contending that the grouping argu-
ment lacks merit, the government
says that Glover's counsel did not
act unreasonably in failing to pre-
sent a meritless claim. The govern-
ment also contends that, on appeal,
Glover's counsel merely decided to
bypass the grouping issue in order
to focus on other claims and maxi-
mize the likelihood of success.
The government then argues that,
in any event, Glover was not preju-
diced by his counsel's failure to
raise the grouping claim. Because of
the nature of the sentencing guide-
lines system, the government
asserts that it will often be difficult
(Continued on Page 144)
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for a defendant to establish the nec-
essary degree of probability that an
omitted legal claim (even if merito-
rious) would have affected the out-
come of a sentencing proceeding.
The government observes that when
a legal claim that counsel failed to
present adequately would not have
resulted in a guidelines range below
the defendant's sentence, the defen-
dant will be unable to establish a
reasonable probability that a more
effective attorney would have
helped produce a different result.
Even if Glover were correct that his
money-laundering and labor racke-
teering offenses should have been
grouped, the government says, that
grouping would have increased,
rather than decreased, the applica-
ble guidelines range.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Federal Uniform Sentencing
Guidelines operate by listing a num-
ber of offense and offender charac-
teristics and then calculating a
defendant's sentence on the basis of
these characteristics. As a result,
sentencing under the guidelines in
federal court is a highly structured,
formulaic process. The guidelines
are intended to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b).
Since Strickland, the Supreme
Court has evaluated a number of
claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel by criminal defendants. See
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct.
1029 (2000) (applying Strickland to
a claim of ineffectiveness based on
counsel's failure to file a notice of
appeal); Williams v. Taylor, 120
S.Ct. 1495 (2000) (applying
Strickland to a claim of ineffective-
ness based on counsel's failure to
investigate and present substantial
mitigating evidence during capital
sentence proceeding); Smith v.
Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746 (2000)
(applying Strickland to counsel's
decision not to file a full merits brief
on appeal); Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527 (1986) (applying
Strickland to evaluate counsel's fail-
ure to raise a capital sentencing
claim on appeal); Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)
(applying Strickland to counsel's
failure to file a suppression motion);
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168 (1986) (applying Strickland to
a claim that trial counsel failed to
adequately present mitigating evi-
dence); Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52
(1985) (applying Strickland to a
claim of ineffective assistance in a
noncapital plea context).
The Seventh Circuit's "significant
prejudice" requirement is derived
from its interpretation of Lockhart
v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
The Seventh Circuit understands
Lockhart as adding to the prejudice
prong of Strickland a requirement
that the result be "fundamentally
unfair or unreliable." The Fifth
Circuit also applies a "significant
prejudice" test. See Spriggs v.
Collins, 993 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1993).
In Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.
1495 (2000), the Supreme Court
reviewed a decision by the Fourth
Circuit that had denied a defen-
dant's habeas petition despite
acknowledging a reasonable proba-
bility that counsel's incompetence
at the sentencing hearing had
resulted in an increased sentence.
The Fourth Circuit had interpreted
Lockhart as requiring that a defen-
dant claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel show that the result
was "fundamentally unfair or
unreliable."
The Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit, holding that the cor-
rect standard is the Strickland
requirement that the defendant
show that "but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result ... would
have been different." 120 S.Ct. at
1502. The Court explained that
Lockhart provided a narrow excep-
tion to the ordinary prejudice rule.
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